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Abstract
We examine short combinatorial games for three or more players under a new play
convention in which a player who cannot move on their turn is the unique loser.
We show that many theorems of impartial and partizan two-player games under
normal play have natural analogues in this setting. For impartial games with three
players, we investigate the possible outcomes of a sum in detail, and determine the
outcomes and structure of three-player Nim.
1. Introduction
The vast majority of prior work in combinatorial game theory has focused on two-
player games. In this paper, we investigate a novel play convention for N -player
games. When no move is available, the next player is declared the unique loser of
the game, and the other players all win equally. This convention was independently
conceived by Salt in [7]. In one sense, this complicates matters, since more than
one player may have a winning strategy. However, as compared to previous work
on multiplayer games, this convention leads to results that better parallel those for
two-player games under the normal play convention. Our work and objects of study
fit into the general framework for combinatorial game theory laid out in [9].
A summary of much of the prior work done on combinatorial games with three
or more players can be found in I.4 of [8]. This paper is closely connected with the
related work of Propp, Cincotti, and Doles (ne´e Greene).
In [6], Propp considers three-player impartial games with a certain play con-
vention: In analogy with two-player normal play, when no move is available, the
previous player is declared the unique winner of the game. This yields a recursive
characterization of outcome classes N , O, and P in which the test for O contains
a proviso reminiscent of the mise`re play convention for two-player games.
In [1], Cincotti considers three-player partizan games under a convention which
reduces to Propp’s in the impartial case. When a player cannot move on their turn,
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2they are eliminated. The other players continue to play from that position. The
last player remaining is the unique winner. Cincotti extends this convention to
N -player games in [2].
In [3], Doles (ne´e Greene) considers three-player partizan games with a conven-
tion similar to Propp’s. The last player to move wins first place. The player before
that wins second place. And the player who cannot move on their turn loses/is
ranked third place. Under this convention, an assumption that players always play
rationally leads to some player having a winning strategy.
In this paper, we consider the play convention in which the first player without an
available move is the unique loser of the game. In Section 2, we examine three-player
impartial games and give special attention to three-player Nim, closely paralleling
the work of Propp in [6]. We examine how the outcome of a disjunctive sum can vary
depending on the outcomes of the summands, discuss reverting games, construct
some undetermined games which make all sums undetermined, and derive the finite
quotient describing play in three-player Nim. In Section 3, we generalize much of
the content of the previous section to N players. We do not completely characterize
the outcomes of a sum or of Nim, but some partial results are obtained, including
the outcomes of all Nim positions with two heaps. In Section 4, we consider partizan
games with N players. We define a preorder based on favorability to a particular
player in disjunctive sums, characterize all comparisons with the empty game 0 (and
show that 0 is not equal to any other partizan game), show that the simplification
theorems regarding dominated and reversible options have natural analogues for
N players, and examine some particular games related to the two-player integer
games. We conclude in Section 5 with a collection of open questions.
2. Three-Player Impartial Games
2.1. Preliminaries
In this subsection, we introduce the games under discussion, the notation and ter-
minology we use for three-player impartial games, and some initial observations.
2.1.1. Notation
Unless otherwise specified, all games in this paper are assumed to be short games;
they have finitely many distinct subpositions, and admit no infinite runs.
As is common, an impartial game is usually considered to be the set of its options,
+ denotes the disjunctive sum of games, n ·G denotes the sum of n copies of G, G′
and G∗ typically denote an option of a game G, etc. We use ∼= to indicate that two
games are isomorphic (i.e. the game trees are isomorphic). Additionally, we also
make use of structural induction in proofs throughout, often without comment.
3Many impartial games in this paper are be built out of nim-heaps. ∗n denotes
a nim-heap of size n. Equivalently, ∗n ∼= {∗0, ∗1, . . . , ∗(n− 1)}. As special cases, 0
denotes the game with no options {}, and ∗ denotes ∗1 (so that ∗ ∼= {0}).
We define the normal play convention for three-player games to be the one in
which the next player to move is the unique loser of the empty game 0. The other
two players both win equally.
Definition 2.1. The (normal-play) outcome o(G) of a game G is a subset of
{N,O,P} whose members are determined recursively as follows.
• N ∈ o(G) exactly when there exists an option G∗ with P ∈ o (G∗).
• O ∈ o(G) exactly when every option G′ satisfies N ∈ o(G′).
• P ∈ o(G) exactly when every option G′ satisfies O ∈ o(G′).
By an induction argument, the elements of o(G) tell us who has a winning strat-
egy in G. N represents the next player to move, P being the previous player, and
O being the other player. When referring to players in the discussion of a single
position, we often use “Next”, “Other”, and “Previous” to refer to the players.
For brevity, we use ∅, N , O, P, PN , NO, OP, and NOP to denote the
corresponding subsets of {N,O,P}. For example, NO = {N,O}.
Unlike in the two-player case, the outcome of a game need not correspond to the
set of winners when all players play perfectly. (This is also noted in [3] and [6].)
Proposition 2.2. In G ∼= {0, {∗, ∗ + ∗}}, Next can only guarantee that they win
by winning with Previous. However, Next and Other can also collude to ensure that
Previous loses.
Proof. If Next plays perfectly, then they must move to 0. Otherwise, Other could
choose to move to ∗ on their turn. However, if Next does not move to 0, then Other
can choose to move to ∗ + ∗ to force (the original) Previous to lose. Therefore,
o(G) = N despite the fact that both Next and Previous would win if Next were to
play perfectly.
2.1.2. Observations
Proposition 2.3. o(G) is always a proper subset of NOP.
Proof. Let G be a game with o(G) = NOP. Then, by the recursive Definition 2.1,
we can choose G∗ with o(G∗) = NOP. Since games do not admit any infinite runs,
no such G can exist.
Proposition 2.4. N ∈ o(G) exactly when O ∈ o ({G}), O ∈ o(G) exactly when
P ∈ o ({G}), and P ∈ o(G) exactly when N ∈ o ({G}).
4Proof. Immediate from the recursive definitions of Definition 2.1.
Proposition 2.5. All seven proper subsets of NOP are possible outcomes.
Proof. These examples are readily verified: o(0) = OP, o(∗) = PN , o ({∗}) =
NO, o(∗2) = N , o ({∗2}) = O, o ({{∗2}}) =P, and o ({∗2, {∗2}}) = ∅.
Definition 2.6. A game G is said to be undetermined if o(G) = ∅.
Proposition 2.7. If G has an undetermined option G∗ and has no option G′ with
P ∈ o(G′), then G is undetermined.
Proof. The existence of G∗ means that O,P /∈ o(G), and the other condition forces
N /∈ o(G).
2.2. General Results
In this subsection, we investigate the outcomes of sums of games, and derive some
equations and inequations for games.
2.2.1. Outcomes of Sums
In the two-player theory of impartial games under normal play, if we put aside
the more-precise Sprague–Grundy Theory, there are two main facts worth noting
about the outcomes of sums as compared to the outcomes of the summands: 1. the
outcome of G + G, and 2. the possible outcomes of G + H—if o(H) = P then
o(G+H) = o(G), but if o(G) = o(H) = N then o(G+H) can be either P or N .
We examine three-player analogues of these results.
Theorem 2.8 (Next Generation). If N /∈ o(H), then o(G + H) ⊆ o(G).
In other words, adding on a component to a game cannot introduce a winning
strategy for a new player unless Next has a winning strategy in the new component.
Since o(0) = OP, this is similar to the two-player result that adding a P-position
to a game does not change its outcome.
Proof. Let G,H be games, and suppose N /∈ o(H).
If P /∈ o(G), then we can choose an option G∗ with O /∈ o (G∗). But then
O /∈ o (G∗ + H) by inductive hypothesis, so that P /∈ o(G + H).
If O /∈ o(G), then we can choose an option G∗ with N /∈ o (G∗). But then
N /∈ o (G∗ + H) by induction, so that O /∈ o(G + H).
If N /∈ o(G), then P /∈ o (G′) for all options G′. Similarly, P /∈ o (H ′) for
all options H ′. Therefore, by induction, we have both P /∈ o (G′ + H) and P /∈
o (G + H ′) for arbitrary options. As such, N /∈ o(G + H) by definition.
5Corollary 2.9. If G and H are undetermined, then G + H is undetermined.
Proof. By Next Generation, N /∈ o(H) yields o(G + H) ⊆ o(G) = ∅.
Next Generation has an important consequence for sums of two games.
Theorem 2.10 (Other Procreation). If O /∈ o(G), o(H), then P /∈ o(G + H).
In other words, a sum of two games cannot produce a winning strategy for
Previous unless Other has a winning strategy in one of the summands.
Proof. Since O /∈ o(G), o(H), we can choose options G∗ and H∗ such that N /∈
o (G∗) , o (H∗). By Next Generation, N /∈ o (G∗ + H∗), so that O /∈ o (G + H∗) and
P /∈ o(G + H).
With Other Procreation in hand, we can strengthen Corollary 2.9.
Corollary 2.11. If o(G), o(H) ⊆P, then G + H is undetermined.
Proof. By Next Generation, o(G + H) ⊆ o(G) ⊆ P. But by Other Procreation,
P /∈ o(G + H). Therefore, o(G + H) = ∅.
Corollary 2.12. If G is undetermined, then P /∈ o(G + H) for any H.
Proof. Suppose (G,H) is a counterexample. By Next Generation, N ∈ o(H) as
otherwise o(G + H) ⊆ o(G) = ∅. Also, since N /∈ o(G), we have o(G + H) ⊆ o(H)
so that P ∈ o(H) as well. Since o(H) 6= NOP, we have O /∈ o(H), and the
contradiction follows immediately from Other Procreation.
With two players, G + H can have any normal-play outcome not disallowed by
the two-player version of Next Generation (e.g. if o(G) = o(H) = N then o(G+H)
can be either P or N ). This result has a three-player analogue.
Theorem 2.13. All outcomes of a sum of two games not immediately disallowed
by Next Generation or Other Procreation are possible.
Proof. For a list of representative examples, see Table 9 in the Appendix. For
instance, o(∗2) = N , o(∗) =PN , and o(∗2 + ∗) = NO.
The possible outcomes of sums are summarized in Table 1, where entries indicate
that any subset (other than NOP) is possible. For example, if o(G) = O and
o(H) =PN , then o(G + H) may be any of ∅,N ,P,PN .
As in [6], we also examine sums of a game with itself. For example, if o(G) = ∅
or o(G) = P, then o(G + G) = ∅ by Corollary 2.11. And if o(G) = O, then
o(G + G) = O or o(G + G) = ∅, by Next Generation. In fact, there are no new
obstructions for o(G + G).
6+ ∅ N O P NO OP PN
∅ ∅ N ∅ ∅ NO ∅ N
N N NO N N NOP N NO
O ∅ N O ∅ NO O PN
P ∅ N ∅ ∅ NO P N
NO NO NOP NO NO NOP NO NOP
OP ∅ N O P NO OP PN
PN N NO PN N NOP PN NO
Table 1: The three-player pairwise addition table
Theorem 2.14. G + G can have any outcome not disallowed by Next Generation
and Other Procreation.
Proof. For examples of all 23 cases, see Table 7 in the Appendix. For instance,
o(∗2) = N and o(∗2 + ∗2) = O.
The possible outcomes of the sum of a game with itself are summarized in Table 2.
o(G) o(G + G)
∅ = ∅
N ⊆ NO
O ⊆ O
P = ∅
NO ⊆ NOP
OP ⊆ OP
PN ⊆ NO
Table 2: The three-player doubling table
In the impartial two-player setting, the Tweedledum–Tweedledee strategy yields
o(G + G) =P. A similar result holds for three players.
Proposition 2.15. For all games G, N /∈ o(G + G + G).
Proof. The other two players can guarantee Next’s loss by mirroring their moves in
the other two components.
Combined with Next Generation and Other Procreation, this theorem reduces
the possibilities for o(G + G + G) to those listed in Table 3.
Proposition 2.16. All cases in Table 3 are possible, except perhaps for o(G) = N ,
where it is not known whether P ∈ o(G + G + G) occurs.
7o(G) o(G + G + G)
∅ = ∅
N ⊆ OP
O ⊆ O
P = ∅
NO ⊆ OP
OP ⊆ OP
PN ⊆ OP
Table 3: The three-player trebling table
Proof. See Table 8 in the Appendix for example games covering the known cases.
For instance, o(∗) =PN , but o(∗+ ∗+ ∗) = OP.
2.2.2. Equality of Impartial Games
As in the two-player case, we are interested in when games are similar enough to
be replaced in disjunctive sums. As is standard, we define = by the fundamental
equivalence (see [8]).
Definition 2.17. (Impartial Equality) We say G equals H and write G = H if
o(G + X) = o(H + X) for all impartial games X.
We first examine reversible moves, as they are key to understanding equality
classes of two-player games, both in normal and mise`re play. Our presentation is
based on the similar Definition V.1.3 in [8].
Definition 2.18. Let G,H be games. We say that H is revertible to G if both of
the following hold.
• For every option G′ of G, H has a corresponding option Ĝ′ equal to G′.
• For every option H ′ of H not equal to some G′, H ′ has a second option H ′∗∗
equal to G.
In two-player settings, if H is revertible to G (with a slight modification in mise`re
play), then H = G. With three-players under normal play, only one conclusion holds
in general (see Proposition 2.21).
Theorem 2.19. If H is revertible to G, then o(H + X) ⊆ o(G + X) for all X.
Proof. Suppose N ∈ o(H + X). If the winning move has the form H + X∗, then
P ∈ o(H +X∗) so that P ∈ o(G+X∗) by induction. Hence, the same move would
win in G + X, and N ∈ o(G + X). Now suppose the winning move in H + X
is to something of the form Ĝ∗ + X with Ĝ∗ equal to an option G∗ of G. Then
P ∈ o(Ĝ∗+X) = o(G∗+X), so that N ∈ o(G+X). Finally, if the winning move is
to an option H∗ not equal to an option of G, then the other two players can move
8to yield some H∗∗∗+X where H∗∗∗ = G. Note that N ∈ o(H∗∗∗+X) as we started
with a winning move in H + X. From H∗∗∗ = G it follows that N ∈ o(G + X), as
desired.
Suppose O ∈ o(H +X). Then N ∈ o(H +X ′) for all options X ′. By induction,
N ∈ o(G+X ′) for all X ′ as well. Since O ∈ o(H+X), we also have N ∈ o(Ĝ′+X) =
o(G′+X) for all options G′ as well. We have shown N ∈ o ((G + X)′) for all options,
so O ∈ o(G + X).
The argument for P ∈ o(H + X) is exactly analogous to that for O.
The phrasing of Corollary 2.20 is from the Replacement Lemma V.1.2 in [8].
Corollary 2.20. Suppose that G ∼= {G′i : i ∈ I}, H ∼= {H ′i : i ∈ I}, and G′i = H ′i
for all i. Then G = H.
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show that o(H +X) ⊆ o(G+X) for all X. But
that follows immediately from Theorem 2.19 since H is revertible to G.
Unfortunately, the reverse inclusion for Theorem 2.19 does not always hold in
this three-player setting. For instance, it is not true that 3 · ∗ = 0, even though
in the two-player setting, 2 · ∗ = 0 holds in the both the partizan normal-play and
impartial mise`re-play contexts.
Proposition 2.21. 3 · ∗ 6= 0.
Proof. It is useful to give the players consistent names throughout, even though
which one is next to play varies; for this purpose, we call the first three players to
move “Nicky”, “Olly”, and “Pat”.
Define X ∼= {{0, ∗+∗}}. In 0+X, Olly can win by making the move to 0. But in
the sum 3 · ∗+X, Nicky and Pat can stop Olly from winning. First, Nicky moves in
the 3 · ∗ component to ∗+ ∗. Then, no matter which move Olly makes, it’s possible
for Pat to move to a position isomorphic to {3 · ∗, ∗, {0, ∗+ ∗}}, from which Nicky
can move to 3 · ∗. The lines of play are illustrated in the game graph below.
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PN
PN
NO
OP
N
PN
o(X) = NO
NO
NO O
PN
o(3 · ∗+ X) = N
P
Definition 2.22. A game G is said to be absorbing if G + H is undetermined for
any game H.
Proposition 2.23. If G and H are absorbing games, then G = H.
Proof. Note that o(G + X) = ∅ = o(H + X) for all X.
Therefore, there is at most one equality class of absorbing games.
Proposition 2.24. If G is an absorbing game, then G + H = G for any H.
Proof. Note that o ((G + H) + X) = o (G + (H + X)) = ∅ = o(G + X).
Proposition 2.24 justifies the name “absorbing”.
Theorem 2.25 (Absorbing Game Construction). Suppose that G has at least one
option, and all options G′ are undetermined (o(G′) = ∅). Then G is an absorbing
game.
Proof. Let G be as in the statement. Since o(G′) = ∅ for all options G′, P /∈
o(G′+X) by Corollary 2.12. By induction, o(G+X ′) = ∅ for all X ′. If X  0, then
o(G+X) = ∅ by Proposition 2.7 since o (G + X∗) = ∅ for some option X∗. If X ∼= 0,
then since G has at least one option G∗ with o (G∗) = ∅, o(G + X) = o(G) = ∅ by
Proposition 2.7.
Corollary 2.26. An absorbing game exists.
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Proof. By Proposition 2.5, o ({∗2, {∗2}}) = ∅. Therefore, by the Absorbing Game
Construction, {{∗2, {∗2}}} is an absorbing game.
The Nim position 3 · ∗3 is also absorbing (see Lemma 2.37). By Proposition 2.23,
all such games are equal.
Proposition 2.27. If G,H, J are undetermined, then all options of G+H +J are
undetermined.
Proof. Let G,H, J be undetermined. Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that G +
H + J has an option that is not undetermined. Without loss of generality, suppose
J∗ is an option of J satisfying o (G + H + J∗) 6= ∅. Since G is undetermined,
Corollary 2.12 yields P /∈ o (G + (H + J∗)). Therefore, either N ∈ o (G + H + J∗)
or O ∈ o (G + H + J∗).
Suppose N ∈ o (G + H + J∗). Then either P ∈ o (G + H + J∗∗) for some J∗∗
or (without loss of generality) P ∈ o (G + H∗ + J∗) for some H∗. But both are
impossible by Corollary 2.12.
Now suppose O ∈ o (G + H + J∗). Since G,H are undetermined, Corollary 2.11
yields that G + H is undetermined. By Next Generation, N ∈ o (J∗). Hence, we
can choose a winning move J∗∗. Then N ∈ o (G + H + J∗∗). By the argument from
the previous paragraph, Corollary 2.12 yields a contradiction in this case, too.
Corollary 2.28. If G is undetermined, then 3 ·G is an absorbing game.
Proof. Combine Proposition 2.27 with the Absorbing Game Construction.
Note that we can find many equal absorbing games with Proposition 2.24 and
Corollary 2.28. And by using Corollary 2.20, we can build many games equal to a
given one that has an absorbing subposition.
2.3. Three-Player Nim
Nim is a classic ruleset in Combinatorial Game Theory that can serve as a demon-
strative case study. In this subsection, we calculate the outcomes of all Nim po-
sitions, as well as the quotient corresponding to playing only Nim. When playing
Nim with three players under normal play, there are only finitely many different
classes of positions to be concerned with, though more than in the play convention
considered in [6].
In the language of [4], the positions of three-player Nim form a three-player
analogue of a “universe”. But it is not “parental” as all Nim positions are impartial.
And it is not “dense” even in an impartial sense, as no Nim position has outcome
P (see Theorem 2.40).
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2.3.1. Outcomes of Nim Positions
We classify the outcomes of Nim positions. We start by noting the outcomes of
40 particular positions, and then use a few lemmas to justify that the apparent
patterns extend to all positions. This approach is similar to applications of the
Octal Periodicity Theorem (see Thm. IV.2.7 of [8]).
Lemma 2.29. The outcomes of 40 Nim positions of the form k · ∗+G are recorded
in Table 4.
G\k 0 1 2 3
0 OP PN NO OP
∗2 N NO PN N
∗3 N NO N N
∗4 N NO N N
∗2 + ∗2 O N NO O
∗2 + ∗3 ∅ N NO ∅
∗2 + ∗4 ∅ N NO ∅
∗2 + ∗2 + ∗2 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
∗2 + ∗2 + ∗3 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
∗2 + ∗2 + ∗4 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 4: The three-player outcomes of 40 Nim positions
Proof. These outcomes can be calculated manually or with a computer program.
Definition 2.30. A game G is said to be 3-periodic if the infinite sequence of
outcomes (o(G), o(∗+ G), o(2 · ∗+ G), . . . ) has period 3.
Lemma 2.31 (Nim Periodicity). Let G be a game. Suppose that all options G′ are
3-periodic and that o (G) = o (3 · ∗+ G). Then G is 3-periodic as well.
Proof. Suppose k ≥ 4. Then the options of k · ∗+G are (k − 1) · ∗+G and those of
the form k · ∗+G′ for options G′. These have the same outcomes as (k − 4) · ∗+G
(by induction on k) and (k − 3) · ∗ + G′ (since G′ is 3-periodic), respectively. But
those are exactly all of the options of (k − 3) · ∗+ G. Since k · ∗+ G has the same
outcomes of options, o (k · ∗+ G) = o ((k − 3) · ∗+ G), as desired.
Lemma 2.32 (Nim Stability). Let G be a game. Suppose that for all subpositions H
of G (including G itself) o (H + ∗4) = o (H + ∗3). Then o (G + ∗m) = o (G + ∗3)
for all m ≥ 3.
Proof. Let m ≥ 4. Via induction on m, it suffices to verify that o (G + ∗ (m + 1)) =
o (G + ∗m).
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The options of G + ∗ (m + 1) are G + ∗m, those of the form G + ∗` for ` < m
(all of which are options of G + ∗m), and those of the form G′ + ∗ (m + 1).
By induction on m, o (G + ∗m) = o (G + ∗ (m− 1)). And by induction on G,
o (G′ + ∗ (m + 1)) = o (G′ + ∗m). Trivially, o (G + ∗`) = o (G + ∗`). In all cases,
an option of G + ∗ (m + 1) has the same outcome as an option of G + ∗m.
Conversely, the options of G + ∗m are those of the form G + ∗` for ` < m, and
those of the form G′+ ∗m. All of which have outcome equal to that of an option of
G + ∗ (m + 1).
As outcomes of options are the same, o (G + ∗(m + 1)) = o(G + ∗m).
Lemma 2.33. The patterns of outcomes for the Nim positions of the form k · ∗+G
in Table 5 are accurate.
Proof. Apply Nim Periodicity to the upper 7 rows of Table 4, and then apply Nim
Stability to 0, followed by ∗2.
G\k (mod 3) ≡ 0 ≡ 1 ≡ 2
0 OP PN NO
∗2 N NO PN
∗m N NO N
∗2 + ∗2 O N NO
∗2 + ∗m ∅ N NO
Table 5: The outcomes of some Nim positions of the form k · ∗+ G (m ≥ 3)
Lemma 2.34. For all k ≥ 0, and m2 ≥ m1 ≥ 3, o (k · ∗+ ∗m1 + ∗m2) = ∅.
Proof. Set G ∼= k · ∗ + ∗m1 + ∗m2. If k = 0, then G has the undetermined option
∗2 + ∗m2 by Lemma 2.33. If k ≥ 1, then G has the undetermined option (k − 1) ·
∗ + ∗m1 + ∗m2 by induction on k. By Proposition 2.7, it suffices to show that no
option G′ has P ∈ o(G′). By induction and Lemma 2.33, the only subpositions
with that property are of the form j · ∗+ ∗2 or j · ∗, neither of which is possible for
an option.
Lemma 2.35. For all k ≥ 0 and n ≥ 2, o(k · ∗+ ∗2 + ∗2 + ∗n) = ∅.
Proof. Apply Nim Periodicity to the lower 3 rows of Table 4, and then apply Nim
Stability to ∗2 + ∗2.
Lemma 2.36. For all k ≥ 0, and m2 ≥ m1 ≥ 3, o (k · ∗+ ∗2 + ∗m1 + ∗m2) = ∅.
Proof. By Lemma 2.34, the option k ·∗+∗m1+∗m2 is undetermined. The outcomes
of options G′ are listed by Lemmas 2.33 through 2.35. And the only subpositions
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where Previous has a winning strategy are of the form j · ∗ + ∗2 or j · ∗. By
Proposition 2.7, k · ∗+ ∗2 + ∗m1 + ∗m2 is undetermined.
Lemma 2.37. For all m1,m2,m3 ≥ 3, ∗m1 + ∗m2 + ∗m3 is an absorbing game.
Proof. By the Absorbing Game Construction (Theorem 2.25), it suffices to show
that all options have outcome ∅. If all heaps of an option have size at least 3, then
the outcome is ∅ by induction. If an option has reduced a heap to ∗2, then the
outcome is ∅ by Lemma 2.36. If the move reduces a heap to ∗ or eliminates a heap,
then the outcome is ∅ by Lemma 2.34.
Lemma 2.38. For all n2 ≥ n1 ≥ 2, ∗2 + ∗2 + ∗n1 + ∗n2 is an absorbing game.
Proof. By the Absorbing Game Construction, it suffices to show that all options
have outcome ∅. If an option has four heaps of size at least 2 then the outcome is ∅
by induction. Otherwise, the outcome is ∅ by Lemma 2.35 or 2.36, as applicable.
Lemma 2.39. Any Nim position that has at least three heaps of size at least 3, or
at least four heaps of size at least 2 is an absorbing game.
Proof. By Lemmas 2.37 and 2.38, any such position has an absorbing game as a
summand. By Proposition 2.24, the entire position is an absorbing game.
Theorem 2.40. The outcome of a Nim position is determined by the numbers of
heaps of size 1, size 2, and size at least 3. Specifically, the outcome is ∅ unless the
position has the form k · ∗+∗n or k · ∗+∗2 +∗n, in which case the outcome is listed
in Table 5.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 2.29 and Lemmas 2.33 through 2.39.
2.3.2. Nim Quotient
In direct analogy to mise`re quotients (as covered in V.4 of [8]), we define an equiv-
alence relation on the set of Nim positions which is coarser than “=”. While the
two-player mise`re quotient of Nim is infinite, the three-player normal play quotient
of Nim has size 16.
Definition 2.41. If G and H are Nim positions, then we write G ≡ H if o(G+X) =
o(H + X) for all Nim positions X.
Proposition 2.42. If G,H, J are Nim positions and G ≡ H, then G+J ≡ H +J .
Proof. Since Nim positions are closed under addition, J + X is a Nim position
whenever X is, so that o ((G + J) + X) = o (G + (J + X)) = o (H + (J + X)) =
o ((H + J) + X), where the middle equation comes from G ≡ H.
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Proposition 2.43. If G,H, J,K are Nim positions and both G ≡ H and J ≡ K
hold, then G + J ≡ H + K.
Proof. By two applications of Proposition 2.42, G+J ≡ H+J ∼= J+H ≡ K+H ∼=
H + K.
For convenience, let Q be the set of equivalence classes of Nim positions under
≡. Note that since 0 is a Nim position, Proposition 2.43 gives Q the structure of a
commutative monoid. As with the convention for mise`re quotients, let Φ(G) denote
the equivalence class of a Nim position G. We follow convention to write elements
of Q with lowercase letters and the operation multiplicatively. For example, if
x = Φ(G) and y = Φ(H), then xy = Φ(G + H); we also write 1 = Φ(0).
Proposition 2.44. For a Nim position G, Φ(G) determines o(G).
Proof. Since 0 is a Nim position, note that G ≡ H implies o(G) = o(G + 0) =
o(H + 0) = o(H).
Since the restriction of o to the Nim positions factors through Q, we adopt
notation from V.6 of [8] and use Π to denote the corresponding map on Q. For
example, Π(1) = Π (Φ(0)) = OP.
Definition 2.45. The Nim quotient is the structure (Q, ·,Π).
For convenience, for the remainder of this subsection, define a = Φ(∗), b = Φ(∗2),
and c = Φ(∗3).
Theorem 2.46. The Nim quotient is given by the commutative monoid with presen-
tation (Q, ·) ∼= 〈a, b, c | a3 = 1, b4 = b3 = b2c = bc2 = c2 = c3 = ac2 = a2c2〉 (which
has order 16) and the values of Π given in Table 6.
x 1 a a2 b ab a2b c ac a2c b2 ab2 a2b2 bc abc a2bc c2
Π(x) OP PN NO N NO PN N NO N O N NO ∅ N NO ∅
Table 6: Outcomes of the three-player Nim quotient
To prove Theorem 2.46, we verify various facts individually as a series of lemmas.
Lemma 2.47. The outcomes in Table 6 are accurate.
Proof. All of the outcomes follow directly from Lemma 2.33, with the exception of
Π(c2), which follows from Lemma 2.34.
Lemma 2.48. a3 = 1, that is, ∗+ ∗+ ∗ ≡ 0.
Proof. In Theorem 2.40, the outcomes only depend on the number of heaps of size
1 modulo 3.
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Lemma 2.49. The 16 equivalence classes listed in Table 6 are distinct.
Proof. Note that Π is well defined on equivalence classes, so the only pairs of classes
that might be identical are those with the same outcome. We apply Lemma 2.48
repeatedly below.
• a 6= a2b because Π (a2) = NO and Π (a3b) = Π (1b) = Π (b) = N .
• a2, ab, ac, a2b2, a2bc are all distinct because the outcomes after multiplying by
a are OP,PN ,N ,O, ∅, respectively.
• b, c, a2c, ab2, abc are all distinct because the outcomes after multiplying by a2
are PN ,N ,NO,O, ∅, respectively.
• bc 6= c2 because Π(abc) = N and Π(ac2) = ∅ by Lemma 2.34.
It remains to prove enough other relations to conclude that Table 6 is complete.
Lemma 2.50. For each n ≥ 3, c = Φ(∗n), that is, ∗3 ≡ ∗n.
Proof. In Theorem 2.40, none of the outcome determinations depend on the exact
size of a heap that has size at least 3.
Lemma 2.51. For any x ∈ Q, xb3 = xb2c = xc2 = c2.
Proof. We prove this equivalence by showing that all representatives have outcome
∅. By Lemma 2.50, the only values of x to be concerned about are products of a,
b, and c. If x is a power of a, then Π(xb3) = ∅ and Π(xb2c) = ∅ by Lemma 2.35,
and Π(xc2) = ∅ by Lemma 2.34. If x contains at least one factor of b, then
Π(xb3) = Π(xb2c) = ∅ by Lemma 2.38 and Π(xc2) = ∅ by Lemma 2.36 (if x
contains only one factor of b and none of c) or Lemma 2.39 (if x contains a factor of
c or a factor of b2). If x contains a factor of c, then Π(xb3) = Π(xb2c) = Π(xc2) = ∅
by Lemma 2.39.
By Lemma 2.39, ∗2+∗2+∗2+∗2 and ∗3+∗3+∗3 are absorbing games. But note
that Lemma 2.51 tells us that in the context of Nim positions only, ∗2 + ∗2 + ∗2
and ∗3 + ∗3 have a similar absorbing property.
Corollary 2.52. b4 = b3 = b2c = bc2 = c2 = c3 = ac2 = a2c2.
Lemma 2.53. There are only 16 elements of Q as listed in Table 6, and the pre-
sentation in the statement of Theorem 2.46 is accurate.
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Proof. By a3 = 1 (from Lemma 2.48) and b3 = b4 and c2 = c3 (from Corollary 2.52)
and the commutativity of disjunctive sum, the only possible elements of Q are of
the form axbycz for x, z < 3, y < 4. However, if z = 2 or y+ z ≥ 3 then the element
is equal to c2 by Corollary 2.52. This leaves 15 other possibilities with y + z < 3
and z < 2, for a total of 16.
With this, we have proven Theorem 2.46. For comparison, in Section 5 of [6], Nim
is analyzed under Propp’s play convention in which Previous is the unique winner
of 0. Rephrasing his results in our terminology, the three-player Nim quotient for
that play convention has size 9, though he shows that there are infinitely many
equality classes of Nim positions.
Note that in the case of Nim positions alone, we recover something like a more
faithful version of Next Generation (Theorem 2.8).
Corollary 2.54. If G is a Nim position satisfying o(G) = OP = o(0), then
o (G + H) = o(H) for all Nim positions H.
Proof. By Theorem 2.46, Φ(G) = 1. Thus, o(G + H) = Π (1Φ(H)) = o(H).
3. N-Player Impartial Games
Many results from Section 2 can be generalized to N players. Throughout this
entire section, N refers to the number of players (N ≥ 2). We explicitly mention
when assuming N > 2 is necessary.
For some results, the results and proofs are nearly identical to those in the three-
player case, but others become more complex, such as the construction of absorbing
games for N players.
A game is still a finite set of options, and we continue to use ∼= to indicate that
two games are isomorphic (i.e. the game trees are isomorphic).
3.1. Preliminaries
In the impartial setting, we denote the various players as N,O1, . . . ,ON−2,P. N is
the “Next” player, P is the “Previous” player, and the rest are the “Other” players.
At times, it is convenient to use O0 for N and ON−1 for P.
Definition 3.1. The N -player (normal-play) outcome o(G) of a game G is a subset
of {N, . . . ,P} whose members are determined recursively as follows.
• N ∈ o(G) exactly when there exists an option G′ with P ∈ o(G′).
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ N−1, Oi ∈ o(G) exactly when every option G′ has Oi−1 ∈ o(G′).
Proposition 3.2. The following analogues of the propositions in 2.1.2 all hold.
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1. o(G) is always a proper subset of {N,O1, . . . ,ON−2,P}.
2. For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 2, Oi ∈ o(G) exactly when Oi+1 ∈ o ({G}). And P ∈ o(G)
exactly when N ∈ o ({G}).
3. If G has an option G∗ with o(G∗) = ∅ and has no option G′ with P ∈ o(G′),
then o(G) = ∅.
4. If N > 2, then all 2N − 1 proper subsets are possible outcomes.
Proof. The proofs of claims 1, 2, and 3 are exactly analogous to the proofs in the
three-player case in 2.1.2. For claim 4, we need a more general idea.
For any non-empty outcome set that includes N, we can use a game with various
options of the form m · ∗. For example, if there are at least 6 players (if N ≥ 6),
then {∗, 3 · ∗, 4 · ∗} is a game in which Next chooses whether O2, O4, or O5 will
lose; all other players are guaranteed to win.
For a non-empty outcome set that does not include N, we can apply claim 2 to
cycle the outcome set of a game whose outcome includes N. For example, if N = 6,
then {{∗, 3 · ∗, 4 · ∗}} has outcome {O1,O2,O4}.
Finally, we construct a game G with o(G) = ∅, if N > 2, we can take G ∼=
{H, {H}} where H ∼= {0, . . . , (N − 2) · ∗}. In this game, Next chooses whether O1
or O2 selects any player (other than themselves) to lose the game.
3.2. Outcomes of Sums
Theorem 3.3 (N -Player Next Generation). If N /∈ o(H) then o(G + H) ⊆ o(G).
Note that N /∈ o(H) is still equivalent to o(H) ⊆ o(0) in the N -player setting.
In fact, the proof for N players is nearly identical to the one for three players.
Proof. Let G,H be games, and suppose N /∈ o(H).
If Oi /∈ o(G) for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, then we can choose an option G∗
with Oi−1 /∈ o (G∗). But then Oi−1 /∈ o (G∗ + H) by inductive hypothesis, so that
Oi /∈ o(G + H).
If N /∈ o(G), then P /∈ o (G′) for all options G′. Similarly, P /∈ o (H ′) for
all options H ′. Therefore, by induction, we have both P /∈ o (G′ + H) and P /∈
o (G + H ′) for arbitrary options. As such, N /∈ o(G + H) by definition.
We generalize Other Procreation in two respects—more summands, and different
players.
Theorem 3.4. For k ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, if N > km and Om /∈ o(G1), . . . o(Gk), then
Okm /∈ o(G1 + · · ·+ Gk).
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Proof. Note that the case of k = 1 is trivial, so we assume k ≥ 2.
First, we consider the case m = 0, so that Om = N. By repeatedly applying
Next Generation, N /∈ o (G1 + · · ·+ Gk).
For m > 0, we induct on m. Since Om /∈ o(G1), . . . o(Gk), we can choose
options G∗i such that Om−1 /∈ o (G∗i ) for all i. Then by induction, Okm−k /∈
o (G∗1 + · · ·+ G∗k), so that Okm−(k−1) /∈ o (G1 + G∗2 + · · ·+ G∗k) and similarly for
each successive term until we reach Okm /∈ o (G1 + · · ·+ Gk).
Proposition 2.15 about the outcome of G+G+G generalizes straightforwardly.
Proposition 3.5. For all games G, N /∈ o(N ·G).
Proof. All players can mirror the moves made by Next in the N components.
In the N -player setting, we can still examine reversible moves.
Definition 3.6. We say that H is revertible to G if both of the following hold.
• For every option G′ of G, H has a corresponding option Ĝ′ equal to G′.
• For every option H ′ of H not equal to some G′, H ′ has an (N − 1)st option
H ′∗···∗ equal to G.
Theorem 3.7. If H is revertible to G then o(H + X) ⊆ o(G + X) for all X.
The proof is nearly identical to the argument for three players (see Theorem 2.19),
but is written here in full, for convenience.
Proof. Suppose N ∈ o(H + X). If the winning move has the form H + X∗, then
P ∈ o(H +X∗) so that P ∈ o(G+X∗) by induction. Hence, the same move would
win in G + X, and N ∈ o(G + X). Now suppose the winning move in H + X
is to something of the form Ĝ∗ + X with Ĝ∗ equal to an option G∗ of G. Then
P ∈ o(Ĝ∗ + X) = o(G∗ + X), so that N ∈ o(G + X). Finally, if the winning move
is to an option H∗ not equal to an option of G, then the other N − 1 players can
move to yield some H∗···∗ + X where H∗···∗ = G. Note that N ∈ o(H∗···∗ + X)
as we started with a winning move in H + X. From H∗···∗ = G it follows that
N ∈ o(G + X), as desired.
Suppose Oi ∈ o(H +X) for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Then Oi−1 ∈ o(H +X ′)
for all options X ′. By induction, Oi−1 ∈ o(G + X ′) for all X ′ as well. Since
Oi ∈ o(H + X), we also have Oi−1 ∈ o(Ĝ′ + X) = o(G′ + X) for all options G′ as
well. We have shown Oi−1 ∈ o ((G + X)′) for all options, so Oi ∈ o(G + X).
As with three players, replacing options with equal games yields an equal game.
Corollary 3.8. Suppose that G ∼= {G′i : i ∈ I} and H ∼= {H ′i : i ∈ I} and that
G′i = H
′
i for all i. Then G = H.
19
The proof is identical to that of the three-player case (see Corollary 2.20).
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show that o(H +X) ⊆ o(G+X) for all X. But
that follows immediately from Theorem 3.7 since H is revertible to G.
Proposition 2.21 about 3 · ∗ generalizes to the N -player setting.
Proposition 3.9. If N > 2, then N · ∗ 6= 0.
Proof. In G ∼= {{(N − 1) · ∗, 0}}, all players except O2 have winning strategies.
There is only one decision; O1 can win by moving to 0, in which case O2 loses. O1
loses if they move to (N − 1) · ∗ instead.
However, in G+N · ∗, players N, O2 and (if N > 3) O3 can cooperate to ensure
that O1 loses. Next can move to G+(N −1) · ∗. Then, for either of O1’s moves, O2
can move to G′+(N−2) · ∗. Then O3 (or N if N = 3) can move in G′ to (N−1) · ∗,
for a total position of (2N − 3) · ∗. At this point, O4 is to move unless N < 5, in
which case it is O4−N . In any case, after 2N − 3 more moves, O1 loses.
3.3. Undetermined and Absorbing Games
Recall (see Definition 2.6) that a game G is said to be undetermined if o(G) = ∅.
Proposition 3.10. A sum of undetermined games is undetermined.
Proof. As with Corollary 2.9, this follows from Next Generation (Theorem 3.3).
We can make this result more precise.
Definition 3.11. An undetermined game G is said to be 1-undetermined. And,
for k > 1, G is said to be k-undetermined if G has an option G∗ that is (k − 1)-
undetermined.
In other words, G is k-undetermined if there is a directed path of length k + 1
starting at G through undetermined subpositions. Note that if G is k-undetermined,
then it is also, a fortiori, j-undetermined for 1 ≤ j < k.
Proposition 3.12. If G is k-undetermined and H is m-undetermined, then G+H
is (k + m)-undetermined.
Proof. Let G be k-undetermined and H be m-undetermined.
First, suppose that k = m = 1. Since O1 /∈ o(H), we can choose an option H∗
with N /∈ o(H∗). By Next Generation, we have o(G + H∗) ⊆ o(G) = ∅. Therefore,
G + H is 2-undetermined.
If k > 1, we can choose an undetermined option G∗ of G. Then G∗ + H is
(k − 1) + m-undetermined by induction. Similarly if m > 1.
The concept of k-undetermined games allows us to generalize Corollary 2.12.
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Lemma 3.13. If N > 2 and G is (N − 2)-undetermined, then P /∈ o(G + H) for
all H.
Proof. Since G is (N − 2)-undetermined, we can choose a sequence of N − 2 subpo-
sitions J0, J1, . . . , JN−3 where J0 ∼= G, each Ji+1 is an option of Ji, and each Ji is
undetermined. Note that Ji +H is an subposition of G+H reached after i moves.
Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that P ∈ o(G+H) for some particular game
H. Then P ∈ o(J0 + H), and since J0 is undetermined, Next Generation tells us
that N ∈ o(H) (as otherwise o(J0 + H) ⊆ o(J0) = ∅) and P ∈ o(H).
Since P = ON−1, we have ON−2 ∈ o(J1 +H) (if N > 3). In general, ON−1−j ∈
o(Jj + H) for 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 3.
Since each Jj is undetermined, ON−1−j ∈ o(H) for 0 ≤ j ≤ N − 3 as well, in
addition to the N ∈ o(H) observed initially.
Finally, since JN−3 is undetermined, O1 /∈ o(JN−3). Thus, we can choose an
option J∗N−3 such that N /∈ o
(
J∗N−3
)
. But since O2 ∈ o(JN−3 + H), we have
O1 ∈ o
(
J∗N−3 + H
)
. This forces O1 ∈ o(H).
Putting all of these conclusions about H together, we have shown that all players
have winning strategies in H, which is impossible by claim 1 of Proposition 3.2.
We use this Lemma to generalize Proposition 2.27. Below, bxc denotes the
greatest integer less than or equal to x.
Proposition 3.14. If N > 2 and G is (N − 2)-undetermined, then all options of
bN/2 + 2c ·G are undetermined.
Proof. Let G be (N − 2)-undetermined. Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that
G∗ is an option of G satisfying o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗) 6= ∅. Since G is (N − 2)-
undetermined, Lemma 3.13 yields P /∈ o (G + (bN/2c ·G + G∗)). Therefore, Oj ∈
o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗) for some j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 2}.
Suppose j = 0, so N ∈ o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗). Then there is a winning move;
either P ∈ o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗∗) for some G∗∗ or P ∈ o (bN/2c ·G + G? + G∗)
for some G?. But both cases are impossible by Lemma 3.13.
Now suppose j ≥ 1 and Oj ∈ o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗). Since G is undeter-
mined, Proposition 3.10 yields that bN/2 + 1c · G is undetermined. By Next
Generation, N ∈ o (G∗). Hence, we can choose a winning move G∗∗. Then
Oj−1 ∈ o (bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗∗). If H is a (j − 1)st option of bN/2 + 1c ·G + G∗∗,
then N ∈ o(H).
In particular, by taking the option G∗∗ of each component in the sum when
possible, and the option of G∗ of a component when necessary, we may choose an
option H so that it has at least two components of G. For example, if N = 6 and
j = N−2 = 4, then O3 ∈ 4·G+G∗∗, O1 ∈ 3·G+2·G∗∗, and N ∈ 2·G+G∗+2·G∗∗.
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Since N ∈ o(H), there is an option H∗ with P ∈ o (H∗). Since our chosen H has
at least two components of G, H∗ has at least one. Just as with the j = 0 case,
this is impossible by by Lemma 3.13.
We will not use this fact, but the above proof of Proposition 3.14 would have
worked the same way for any sum of bN/2 + 2c games, each of which is (N − 2)-
undetermined.
Recall (see Definition 2.22) that a game G is said to be absorbing if G + H is
undetermined for all H.
We can use Lemma 3.13 to obtain an N -player analogue of the Absorbing Game
Construction.
Definition 3.15. For k > 1, a game G is said to be strongly k-undetermined if
G  0 and and all options of G are (k − 1)-undetermined.
Equivalently, we could replace “G  0” with “G is undetermined” or “G is
k-undetermined” in the above definition.
Proposition 3.16. If G and H are games such that G is strongly k-undetermined
and H is strongly m-undetermined, then G + H is strongly (k + m)-undetermined.
Proof. Every option of G+H is of the form G′ +H or G+H ′ and is (k +m− 1)-
undetermined by Proposition 3.12.
Theorem 3.17 (N -Player Absorbing Game Construction). Suppose that N > 2
and G is strongly (N − 1)-undetermined. Then for all games H, G+H is undeter-
mined.
Proof. We show by a finite induction on k that Ok /∈ o(G + H) for any H.
First, we handle the base case k = 0. Suppose, for sake of contradiction that
N ∈ o(G + H) for some game H. Then either P ∈ o(G∗ + H) for some G∗ or
P ∈ o(G+H∗) for some H∗. Both cases are impossible by Lemma 3.13; the former
is impossible by since each G∗ is (N −2)-undetermined, and the latter is impossible
since G itself is, a fortiori, (N − 2)-undetermined.
Now suppose Ok ∈ o(G + H) for some k with 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. Then since G is
undetermined, N ∈ o(H) by Next Generation. In particular, H has an option H∗
and thus Ok−1 ∈ o(G + H∗), which is impossible by induction.
Note that Propositions 2.24 and 2.23 hold with the same proofs, so there is
a unique equality class of absorbing games which absorbs summands to produce
undetermined games.
Corollary 3.18. If N > 2 and G is (N − 2)-undetermined, then bN/2 + 2c ·G is
an absorbing game.
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Proof. Note that bN/2 + 2c · G is ((N − 2)bN/2 + 2c)-undetermined by Proposi-
tion 3.12. By Proposition 3.14, bN/2 + 2c · G is strongly undetermined. Since
(N − 2)bN/2 + 2c ≥ N − 1, bN/2 + 2c ·G is an absorbing game by the Absorbing
Game Construction.
Corollary 3.19. If N > 2 and G is undetermined, then (N − 2)bN/2 + 2c · G is
an absorbing game.
Proof. Note that G is at least 1-undetermined, so that (N − 2) · G is (N − 2)-
undetermined by Proposition 3.12. Then apply Corollary 3.18.
3.4. N-player Nim
In this subsection, we apply generalizations of the periodicity/stability lemmas to
obtain some results about Nim that hold for general N .
In this subsection only, it is particularly helpful at times to write complements
of outcomes. For example, if N = 5, then {O2,O3} = {N,O1,P}.
3.4.1. Periodicity
Definition 3.20. A game G is said to be N -periodic if the infinite sequence of
outcomes (o(G), o(∗+ G), o(2 · ∗+ G), . . . ) has period N .
Proposition 3.21 (N -Player Nim Periodicity). Let G be a game. Suppose that all
options G′ are N -periodic, and that o (G) = o (N · ∗+ G). Then G is N -periodic.
The proof is almost identical to that of three-player Nim Periodicity.
Proof. Suppose k ≥ N + 1. Then the options of k · ∗ + G are (k − 1) · ∗ + G and
those of the form k · ∗ + G′ for options G′. These have the same outcomes as
(k −N − 1) ·∗+G (by induction on k) and (k −N) ·∗+G′ (since G′ is N -periodic),
respectively. But those are exactly all of the options of (k −N) · ∗ + G. Since
k · ∗ + G has the same outcomes of options, o (k · ∗+ G) = o ((k −N) · ∗+ G), as
desired.
Proposition 3.22. ∗2 is N -periodic.
Proof. First, note that 0 is N -periodic since o(N · ∗) = o(0) = {N} as there is only
one line of play (or see claim 2 of Proposition 3.2). In general, o(i · ∗) = {Oi} for
i < N .
Since 0 is N -periodic, ∗ is N -periodic as well, so that all options of ∗2 are N -
periodic. Therefore, by Nim Periodicity, it suffices to show that o(∗2+N ·∗) = o(∗2).
We show by induction on i that for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 3, o(∗2 + i · ∗) = {Oi+1,Oi+2}.
Note that if N = 2, then this is vacuously true. If i = 0, then Next can choose
which of O1 and O2 will lose; o(∗2) = {O1,O2}.
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For i > 0, note that Next can move to ∗2 + (i − 1) · ∗, which has outcome
{Oi,Oi+1}, by induction. Since i ≤ N − 3, we have i + 2 ≤ N − 1, so that
Oi+1,Oi+2 /∈ o(∗2+ i · ∗). The other options of ∗2+ i · ∗ are i · ∗ and (i+1) · ∗, which
have outcomes {Oi} and {Oi+1}, respectively. Aside from the three players Next,
Oi+1, and Oi+2, all other players have winning strategies. And since i 6= N − 1,
the move to i · ∗ is a winning move (i.e. P ∈ o(i · ∗)), and so N ∈ o(∗2 + i · ∗). Thus,
o(∗2 + i · ∗) = {Oi+1,Oi+2}, as desired.
Similarly, o(∗2 + (N − 2) · ∗) = {P} since the options have outcomes {ON−2}
(which includes P), {P}, and (if N > 2) {ON−2,P}, respectively.
Then o(∗2 + (N − 1) · ∗) = {O1} since the options have outcomes {P}, {N}
(which includes P), and {P}, respectively.
Finally, we consider o(∗2 + N · ∗). The options have outcomes {N}, {O1}, and
{O1}, respectively. Thus, if N > 2, o(∗2 + N · ∗) = {O1,O2} = o(∗2). (If N = 2,
o(∗2 + N · ∗) = {O1} = {N} = o(∗2).)
Corollary 3.23. The periodic sequence of outcomes o(∗2 + i · ∗) is(
{O1,O2}, {O2,O3}, . . . , {ON−2,P}, {P}, {O1}, . . .
)
.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Proposition 3.22 above.
3.4.2. Stability
Proposition 3.24 (N -player Nim Stability). Let G be a game. Suppose that for
all subpositions H of G (including G itself) o (H + ∗(N + 1)) = o (H + ∗N). Then
o (G + ∗m) = o (G + ∗N) for all m ≥ N .
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Three-Player Nim Stability (Lemma 2.32),
except that 4 should be replaced with k + 1.
In fact, the proof would work with ∗N replaced with any ∗k. However, when G
is a “small” Nim position, it seems that we first observe stability at ∗N .
We can use Nim Stability to calculate the outcomes of all Nim positions with
at most two heaps, assuming N > 2. The results are collected in Theorem 3.29
and can be summarized as follows: Players other than Next and O1 do not have a
winning strategy unless the game is guaranteed to end before their turn. Ignoring
the case of the empty game 0, Next fails to have a winning strategy exactly when
there are two heaps of size at least N − 1, and O1 fails to have a winning strategy
when there is only one heap or if the sizes of the two heaps are at least N − 1 and
N , respectively.
Proposition 3.25. For i ≥ 1, o(∗i) = {O1, . . . ,Omin{i,N−1}}.
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Proof. We use induction on i for 1 ≤ i < N .
If i = 1, then there is only one line of play, and the outcome is certainly {O1}. For
1 < i < N , the options are 0 and all ∗j with 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1. The former has outcome
{N}, and the latter have outcomes of the form {O1, . . . ,Oj}. Since P ∈ o(0),
N ∈ o(∗i). Since N /∈ o(0), O1 /∈ o(∗i). And since O1, . . . ,Oi−1 /∈ o(∗(i − 1)),
O2, . . . ,Oi /∈ o(∗i). Thus, o(∗i) = {O1, . . . ,Omin{i,N−1}}.
Similarly, o(∗N) = {O1, . . . ,ON−1} = {N} by the same argument as for ∗(N−1)
except that it doesn’t matter that P /∈ o (∗(N − 1)). By the same argument, or by
the argument in the proof of Nim Stability, this extends to all larger heaps as
well.
Lemma 3.26. If 1 ≤ i ≤ min{j,N−2} then o(∗i+∗j) = {O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1}}.
Proof. Note that the hypothesis forces N > 2. First, o (∗+ ∗) = {O2} since there
is only one line of play.
Now suppose i + j > 2. Then the options of ∗i + ∗j are ∗i, ∗j, and all smaller
sums of two nonempty heaps of the forms (∗i)′ + ∗j and ∗i + (∗j)′.
Note that O1 /∈ o(∗i) by Proposition 3.25, so that O2 /∈ o(∗i + ∗j).
Since i + j > 2, either 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1 or 1 ≤ j − 1 ≤ i. Thus, by induction,
o (∗i + ∗(j − 1)) = {O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j−1,N−1}}. Hence, O3, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1} /∈
o(∗i + ∗j).
Therefore, o(∗i + ∗j) ⊆ {O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1}}.
Since i ≤ N − 2, P = ON−1 ∈ o(∗i) by Proposition 3.25, so that N ∈ o(∗i+ ∗j).
Finally, note that N and (if i+j ≤ N−1) Omin{i+j,N−1}, . . . ,ON−1 are included
in the outcome of each option (either by Proposition 3.25 or induction, as applica-
ble). Thus, O1 and (if i + j < N − 1) Omin{i+j+1,N−1}, . . . ,ON−1 are elements of
o(∗i + ∗j). In other words, {O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1}} ⊆ o(∗i + ∗j).
Since we have shown both inclusions, o(∗i+ ∗j) = {O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1}}.
Lemma 3.27. o (2 · ∗(N − 1)) = {O1}.
Proof. If N = 2, then o(2 · ∗) = {P} = {O1} since there is only one line of play.
Now assume N > 2. Then the options of 2 ·∗ (N − 1) are ∗(N−1) (with outcome
{N} by Proposition 3.25), and those with two heaps (all of which have outcome
{O2 · · ·ON−1} = {N,O1} by Lemma 3.26). Since no option’s outcome includes
P (as N > 2) and the only element of an outcome shared by all options is N,
o (2 · ∗(N − 1)) = {O1}.
Recall (see Definition 2.6) that a game G is said to be undetermined if o(G) = ∅.
Lemma 3.28. If N > 2, then for N − 1 ≤ i ≤ N + 1 and N ≤ j ≤ N + 1, ∗i+ ∗j
is undetermined.
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Proof. Firstly, we consider ∗(N − 1) + ∗N . It has two single-heap options each
with outcome {N} by Proposition 3.25, the option 2 · ∗(N − 1) with outcome {O1}
by Lemma 3.27, and various options (since N > 2) covered by Lemma 3.26 with
outcome {N,O1}. Since N > 2, O1 6= P, so that o (∗(N − 1) + ∗N) = ∅.
Similarly, ∗N + ∗N and ∗(N − 1) + ∗(N + 1) have all the same sorts of op-
tions except that ∗N + ∗N lacks “2 · ∗(N − 1)” and both have a new move to the
undetermined ∗(N − 1) + ∗N . Thus, o(∗N + ∗N) = o (∗(N − 1) + ∗(N + 1)) = ∅.
∗N+∗(N+1) is similar to ∗N+∗N , but adds the undetermined options ∗N+∗N
and ∗(N − 1) + ∗(N + 1). And ∗(N + 1) + ∗(N + 1) is similar to ∗N + ∗(N + 1),
but adds the undetermined option ∗N + ∗(N + 1).
Theorem 3.29. If N > 2, then for i ≤ j,
o(∗i + ∗j) =

{N} if i = j = 0{
O1, . . . ,Omin{j,N−1}
}
if i = 0 < j{
O2, . . . ,Omin{i+j,N−1}
}
if 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 2
{O1} if i = j = N − 1
∅ otherwise
.
Proof. The first four cases follow immediately from Definition 3.1, Proposition 3.25,
Lemma 3.26, and Lemma 3.27, respectively.
The final claim uses Nim Stability repeatedly.
First, note that o(0 + ∗N) = o (0 + ∗(N + 1)) by Proposition 3.25. Similarly, by
Lemma 3.26, o(∗i+∗N) = o (∗i + ∗(N + 1)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N−2. Also, by Lemma 3.28,
o (∗(N − 1) + ∗N) = ∅ = o (∗(N − 1) + ∗(N + 1)). With all of these results to-
gether, we apply Nim Stability to G = ∗(N − 1) to find that o (∗(N − 1) + ∗m) = ∅
for all m ≥ N . It remains to check that any sum of two heaps of size at least N is
undetermined.
Since o(∗N + ∗N) = ∅ = o (∗N + ∗(N + 1)) by Lemma 3.28, another application
of Nim Stability with G = ∗N yields o (∗N + ∗m) = ∅ for all m ≥ N . And
since o (∗N + ∗(N + 1)) = ∅ = o (∗(N + 1) + ∗(N + 1)), another application with
G = ∗(N + 1) yields o (∗(N + 1) + ∗m) = ∅ for all m ≥ N .
For j ≥ 1, ∗(N + j) + ∗N and ∗(N + j) + ∗(N + 1) are both undetermined.
Therefore, for j ≥ 1, we can recursively apply Nim Stability to show that ∗(N + j)+
∗m is undetermined for m ≥ N .
Corollary 3.30. If N > 2, then some Nim positions are absorbing games.
Proof. By Theorem 3.29, ∗(N − 1) + ∗(2N − 3) is (N − 2)-undetermined. Thus, by
Corollary 3.18, bN/2 + 2c · (∗(N − 1) + ∗(2N − 3)) is an absorbing game. Alterna-
tively, by Lemma 3.28 (or Theorem 3.29), ∗(N − 1) + ∗N is undetermined. Thus,
by Corollary 3.19, bN/2 + 2c(N − 2) · (∗(N − 1) + ∗N) is absorbing. Alternatively,
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by Lemma 3.28 (or Theorem 3.29), 2 · ∗N is 2-undetermined. By Proposition 3.12,
2dN/2−1e·∗N is (N−2)-undetermined. By Corollary 3.18, 2bN/2+2cdN/2−1e·∗N
is an absorbing game. Thus, ((N + 4)(N − 1)/2) · ∗N is absorbing, too.
4. Partizan Games
In this section, we discuss the extension of normal play to the N -player partizan
setting. As in Section 3, throughout this entire section, N refers to the number of
players (N ≥ 2). And we explicitly mention when assuming N > 2 is necessary.
We begin by setting up notation and machinery to discuss and compare partizan
games. In the following subsection, we prove some general results about comparing
games. Finally, we consider some specific games generalizing integers in the two-
player case.
4.1. Preliminaries
Throughout this section, a (partizan) game is now an ordered N -tuple of finite sets
of partizan games. They are still “short” in that they are finite and nonloopy, so
that there is a bound on the length of a run. We continue to use ∼= to indicate
that two games are isomorphic (i.e. their game trees with labeled edges are isomor-
phic). In general, our definitions and notation parallel the two-player standard as
in Section II.1 of [8]. Similar decisions were made in [1], [2], and [3].
The N players are named “Left”, “Center1”, “Center2”, . . . , “CenterN−2”, and
“Right”. They each make moves in a cyclic fashion, with “Left” moving after
“Right” and before “Center1”, etc.
We write some games with an extension of the bar notation commonly used for
two players. For example, G ∼= {G L | G C1 | G C2 | · · · | G CN−2 | GR} or
G ∼=
{
GL1 , . . . , G
L
m0 | GC11 , . . . , GC1m1 | · · · | GR1 , . . . , GRmN−1
}
.
When convenient, we use “C0” in place of L and “CN−1” in place of R. In [1]
and [3], which only consider three-player games, our Center1 is called “Center” and
our C1 is “C”.
If it is Left’s turn to move in G, then they choose one of the Left options in G L
to move to. Analogously for the other players.
If there is no option available to a player on their turn, we declare them the
unique loser, and the other N − 1 players all win equally. As in the impartial case,
we call this convention normal play.
As it should not cause undue confusion, we use 0 in partizan contexts to denote
a game with no options 0 ∼= { | · · · | }. In general, we interpret impartial games as
partizan ones in the natural way; ∗ ∼= {0 | 0 | · · · | 0}, etc. Following [1], we define
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1L ∼= {0 | · · · | }, and analogously 1Ci and 1R. Note that we never use ‖ or similar
to denote “options of options”, as it could be confused with notation like {0 | | 0},
which denotes a particular three-player game with no Center1 options.
4.1.1. Outcomes, Sums, and Conjugates
In order to speak of the outcome of a partizan game, it is helpful to examine the
impartial games that result when we select a player to make the first move.
Definition 4.1. Given a partizan game G, we recursively define N impartial games,
the restrictions of G, as follows. For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 2, the Centeri restriction is
[G]Ci
∼=
{[
GCij
]
Ci+1
}
, where GCij ranges over the options of G for Centeri. The
Right restriction is [G]R
∼=
{[
GRj
]
L
}
, where GRj ranges over the options of G for
Right.
Recall that if i = 0 then Centeri is Left. For examples, [1L]L = ∗, and [1L]C1 = 0.
The outcome of a two-player game is determined by the pair of impartial out-
comes when Left or Right make the first move. We define the outcome in the
N -player case analogously.
Definition 4.2. The outcome o(G) of a partizan game G is the ordered N -tuple
of the impartial outcomes of the restrictions.
o(G) =
(
o ([G]L) , o
(
[G]C1
)
, . . . , o
(
[G]CN−2
)
, o ([G]R)
)
.
For example, (N ,P,O) is the three-player outcome of games where Left and
only Left can secure the win, no matter which player moves first. And the outcome
({N,P}, {N,P}, {N,P}, {N,P}) is the four-player outcome of games where the
next player and the previous player can each guarantee that they win (and if they
play well, they will certainly win together with some other player), no matter which
player moves first.
Proposition 4.3. If N > 2, all
(
2N − 1)N potential outcomes are possible.
For instance, there are 343 possible outcomes of a three-player partizan game,
and 50625 possible outcomes of a four-player partizan game.
Proof. Recall that by claim 4 of Proposition 3.2, there are 2N −1 possible impartial
outcomes. Given impartial outcomes o1, . . . , oN , choose corresponding impartial
games with those outcomes G1, . . . , GN . Then, using N − 1 pairs of braces in
each component, define G ∼= { {· · · {G1} · · · } | · · · | {· · · {GN} · · · } }. Then o(G) =
(o1, . . . , oN ) by construction.
Very analogously to the two-player case, we define the three-player analogue of
the disjunctive sum.
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Definition 4.4. Let G and H be games. The (disjunctive) sum G + H is defined
recursively by
G + H ∼= {GL + H,G + HL | GC1 + H,G + HC1 | · · · | GR + H,G + HR} .
The conjugates of a game G serve as N -player analogues of the two-player neg-
ative −G, in the sense that the players’ roles are interchanged. As these do not
serve the role of an additive inverse, they are reminiscent of the general two-player
conjugate in [4], of which the mise`re adjoint defined in V.6.3 of [8] is a special case.
Definition 4.5. The first conjugate of G, denoted by G†, is defined by
G† ∼=
{(
GR
)† | (GL)† | (GC1)† | · · · | (GCN−2)†} .
In general, the kth conjugate of G is obtained by taking the first conjugate k times,
as in G†···†. We denote the sum of the first N − 1 conjugates G†+G††+ · · ·+G†···†
by G−.
Note that the N th conjugate of G is G itself. For examples, 1C1
∼= 1†L and 1R is
the (N − 1)st conjugate of 1L. If N = 4, then 1−C2 = 1R + 1L + 1C1 .
Proposition 4.6. For all games G, N /∈ o ([G + G−]x) for x = C0, . . . CN−1.
Proof. Analogously to Proposition 3.5, the players who do not move next can mirror
all moves in the other N − 1 terms of the sum.
Note that there is nothing like an absorbing game in the partizan context.
Proposition 4.7. There is no game G with o(G + H) = (∅, . . . , ∅) for all H.
Proof. Let G be a game, and define H ∼= k · 1L, where k is greater than the depth
of the game tree of G. Then Left can win G + H, no matter which player moves
first, by simply making all of their moves in H.
4.1.2. Inequalities
In the two-player setting, we define a preorder by (mise`re or normal play) favor-
ability to Left. With N players, we similarly define preorders by favorability to
an individual player. Our definition is reminiscent of, but incompatible with (see
Corollary 4.49), the definitions in [1]. The definition parallels the characterization
for two-player inequality in Proposition V.6.1 of [8]. It was independently defined,
in essentially this form, in [3].
Definition 4.8. We write G ≤L H if, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , Left has a winning strategy
in H+X moving ith whenever Left has a winning strategy in G+X moving ith. We
also write G L H for the negation of G ≤L H. We define ≤Ci and ≤R analogously.
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For example, if N = 3, G ≤L H, and O ∈ o ([G + X]R), then O ∈ o ([H + X]R).
Many results below are phrased only in terms of ≤L, but they apply equally well,
mutatis mutandis, to the other relations.
Proposition 4.9. ≤L is transitive and reflexive.
Proof. Both properties follow immediately from the corresponding properties of
implication.
Proposition 4.10. If G ≤L H then G + J ≤L H + J for any J .
Proof. Suppose that Left can win (G + J) + X ∼= G + (J + X) moving ith. Then
since G ≤L H, Left can win H + (J + X) ∼= (H + J) + X moving ith.
Corollary 4.11. If G ≤L H and J ≤L K then G + J ≤L H + K.
We define other related notation as well.
Definition 4.12. We write G <L H if G ≤L H but H L G. We define the strict
inequalities for the other players analogously.
Proposition 4.13. If G <L H and H ≤L J , then G <L J . Similarly, if G ≤L H
and H <L J , then G <L J .
Proof. We prove only the first claim, as the second claim is similar. By Proposi-
tion 4.9, G ≤L J , so it suffices to show that J L G. Since G <L H, choose X and
a play order so that Left can win H + X moving ith but does not have a strategy
to win G + X moving ith. Then, since H ≤L J , Left can win J + X moving ith as
well. This witnesses that J L G.
Definition 4.14. We write G =L H and say that G and H are equal for Left if
G ≤L H and H ≤L G. We define =Ci and =R analogously.
Proposition 4.15. Note that if this definition is applied to the two-player case
(N = 2), then G =L H implies G =R H.
Proof. If Left does not have a winning strategy for G + X under some play order,
then Right does under the same play order. Similarly, if Left does have a winning
strategy, then Right does not.
As is standard, we define = by the fundamental equivalence (see [8]).
Definition 4.16 (Partizan Equality). G = H if o(G + X) = o(H + X) for all X.
Proposition 4.17 (Components of Equality). G = H exactly when G =Ci H for
0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
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Proof. Let X be a game. If G =L H, both o(G + X) and o(H + X) have the
same membership (or lack thereof) of N in the first component, P in the second
component, and an appropriate Oi in each other component. Each other =Ci covers
another potential element in each component, and =R covers the last potential
element in each component. Thus, o(G + X) = o(H + X). Since X was arbitrary,
G = H.
The proof of the other direction is immediate.
Corollary 4.18. If G = H and J = K then G + J = H + K.
Proof. This follows from Components of Equality and 2N applications of Corol-
lary 4.11.
4.2. Inequality Results
As in the impartial case, the lack of provisos in the definition of a partizan outcome
allows us to generalize some two-player normal-play results to the N -player setting.
Since the player who cannot move is the unique loser, more moves available for Left
can never hurt them due to timing issues.
We first characterize comparisons with the game 0 and apply this to a study of
G−, and then consider more general inequalities.
Many results below are stated only for Left, using ≤L and =L. But, by symmetry,
there are corresponding results for each other player.
4.2.1. Comparisons with Zero
We begin by confirming some general properties of preordered monoids.
Lemma 4.19. Suppose H + J ≤L 0. If 0 ≤L H, then J ≤L 0.
Proof. If 0 ≤L H, then by Proposition 4.10 we may add J to both sides to obtain
J ≤L H + J ≤L 0.
Proposition 4.20. Suppose H + J ≤L 0. If 0 <L H then J <L 0.
Proof. If 0 <L H then 0 ≤L H so that J ≤L 0 by Lemma 4.19. But if J =L 0, then
0 ≤L J , so that Lemma 4.19 yields H ≤L 0, which would contradict 0 <L H.
Next, we examine which games G satisfy 0 ≤L G. In the proofs of Lemmas 4.21
and 4.22 to follow, we take inspiration from Theorem 7 of [5].
Lemma 4.21. If N > 2 and a player other than Left or Right has an option in G,
then 0 L G.
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Proof. Suppose that Centeri has an option in G for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 2.
Choose m greater than the depth of the game tree of G, and define the games
Y ∼= m · (1L)− (see Definition 4.5) and X to be the game with the two options
XCi ∼= 0 and XCi+1 ∼= Y .
Example game trees for the case of N = 3 are shown below.
Y•
• •
• • • •
...
X
•
• Y
Since N > 2, Centeri+1 isn’t Left. Note that Left can win X with Centeri
moving first, since Centeri+1 loses in the only line of play. But in G + X, Left
cannot guarantee a win with Centeri moving first.
If Centeri moves to some G
Ci+X, then Centeri+1 can move to G
Ci+Y , and then
the players other than Left can outlast all of Left’s available moves in subpositions
of G.
Since Left has a winning strategy in 0 + X but not G + X when Centeri moves
first, 0 L G.
Lemma 4.22. If N > 2 and Right has an option in G, then 0 L G.
Proof. Suppose Right has an option in G. Define Y as in the proof of Lemma 4.21
above, and define the game X to have the two options XC1 ∼= Y and XR ∼= 1L.
The case of N = 3 is illustrated below.
X
•
Y •
•
Note that Left can win X moving second, since Center1 loses in the only line of
play. But in G + X, Left cannot guarantee a win moving second.
Right can move to some GR + X. If GR has no Left option, then Left loses
immediately. Otherwise, Left moves to some GRL + X, in which case Center1 can
move to GRL + Y , and Left will run out of moves first.
Since Left has a winning strategy in 0 +X but not G+X when moving second,
0 L G.
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Proposition 4.23. If G ∼= 0 or G only has Left options, then 0 ≤L G.
Proof. Suppose Left can win X moving ith. Then Left can win G + X moving ith
by making all moves in X, since the other players have no moves available in G.
Theorem 4.24 (Nonnegativity Rule). If N > 2, then 0 ≤L G if and only if G ∼= 0
or G only has Left options.
Proof. This is a combination of Lemmas 4.21 and 4.22, and Proposition 4.23.
Corollary 4.25. Suppose that N > 2, G  0, 0 ≤Ci G, and 0 ≤Cj G. Then i = j.
Proof. By the Nonnegativity Rule, G only has Centeri options and also only has
Centerj options. Since G  0, we must have i = j.
Corollary 4.26. If N > 2 and G = 0, then G ∼= 0.
Proof. By the Components of Equality and Definition 4.14, both 0 ≤L G and
0 ≤R G. A contrapositive of Corollary 4.25 yields G ∼= 0.
Note that this dashes any hopes for a good analogue of the two-player result that
1 + (−1) = 0. For example, 1L + (1L)− 6= 0. However, we confirm in Theorem 4.44
that non-isomorphic partizan games can be equal.
Theorem 4.27 (Nonpositivity Rule). G ≤L 0 if and only if N /∈ o([G]L).
In other words, if Left doesn’t have a winning strategy in G moving first, then G
is no better for Left than 0, in any context. In the two-player case, this corresponds
to the well-known fact that G ≤ 0 exactly when Right can win G playing second.
Proof. For one direction, assume G ≤L 0. Then since Left does not have a winning
strategy in 0+0 moving first, Left does not have a winning strategy in G+0 moving
first.
For the other direction, assume N /∈ o([G]L) and that Left has a winning strategy
in G + X moving ith for some i.
If 2 ≤ i ≤ N , then Left can win all relevant G + X ′ moving (i − 1)st. So, by
induction on X, Left can win all X ′ moving (i−1)st, and so Left can win X moving
ith. Now suppose Left can win G + X moving first.
If a winning move is to some GL + X, then since N /∈ o([G]L), the players
other than Left could play in the GL component to reach some subposition H with
N /∈ o ([H]L) and Left having a winning strategy in H + X moving first. H ≤L 0
by induction on G, so that Left can win X moving first.
In the other case, a winning move is instead to some G+XL. Then Left can win
G+XL moving N th. By induction on X, Left can win XL moving N th as well, so
that XL would be a winning move in X, too.
33
Corollary 4.28. If G ∼= {(1L)− | · · · | } then G =L 0.
Proof. Note that 0 ≤L G by Proposition 4.23 (or the Nonnegativity Rule if N > 2).
But since Left does not win G moving first, G ≤L 0 by the Nonpositivity Rule.
Proposition 4.29. If G is comparable to 0 under each ≤Ci , then one of the fol-
lowing conditions holds, and all cases are possible.
1. G = 0.
2. G <Ci 0 for all i.
3. G =Cj 0 for some j and G <Ci 0 for i 6= j.
4. G >Cj 0 for some j and G <Ci 0 for i 6= j.
Under Cincotti’s convention for ≤Ci , an additional type of case is possible with
precisely two equalities (see Section 4 of [1] and [2]).
Proof. The above cases are all possible with the following examples. Condition 1
is satisfied by 0. Condition 2 is satisfied by 1L + (1L)
−. Condition 3 is satisfied by
a game with only one option in which Centerj can move to (1Cj )
−. Condition 4 is
satisfied by 1Cj .
If none of the four conditions were satisfied, then G  0 and G ≥Ci 0 for at least
two distinct values of i. But this would contradict Corollary 4.25.
We also use the two rules for comparisons with 0 to examine the extent to which
G− is similar to a negative for G.
Proposition 4.30. For any game G, G + G− ≤L 0.
Proof. By Proposition 4.6, N /∈ o([G + G−]L). By the Nonpositivity Rule, G +
G− ≤L 0.
To emphasize, G + G− ≤Ci 0 for any i by symmetry, not just i = 0.
Corollary 4.31. If N > 2 and G  0, then G + G− <L 0.
Proof. By Proposition 4.30, G+G− ≤L 0. Since G  0, G+G− must have a Right
option, so that 0 L G + G− by the Nonnegativity Rule (or Lemma 4.22).
Proposition 4.32. Suppose that N > 2, G  0, and 0 ≤L G. Then G− <L 0.
Proof. By the Nonnegativity Rule, G has only Left options, and has at least one.
Therefore, G− has no Left options, so that Left loses moving first. Thus, by the
Nonpositivity Rule, G− ≤L 0. Since G− has a non-Left option, we apply the
Nonnegativity Rule to find 0 L G−, and so G− <L 0.
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Intuitively, if G never hurts Left, then Left would prefer no change to giving that
same benefit to each of the other players.
Note that we cannot turn this around.
Proposition 4.33. If N > 2 and G  0, then 0 L G−.
Proof. This is immediate from the Nonnegativity Rule.
4.2.2. General Inequalities
In the two-player case, there is a recursive characterization of ≤ (see Thm. II.1.20
in [8]). There is a similar partial characterization of ≤L in the N -player setting.
Theorem 4.34 (Inequality Test). Let G ∼= {GL | GC1 | · · · | GCN−1} and H ∼={
HL | HC1 | · · · | HCN−1}. Suppose that for any option GL there is a corresponding
HL such that GL ≤L HL. Further suppose that for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and for all HCi
there is a corresponding GCi such that GCi ≤L HCi . Then G ≤L H.
Proof. Let X be a game. First, suppose that Left can win G + X moving first. If
Left can win by moving to some GL + X, then they can win GL + X moving last.
Using the assumption, choose an HL so that Left can win HL + X moving last.
Then Left can win H + X moving first by moving to HL + X. If Left cannot win
G+X by moving in G, then Left can win some G+XL moving last. By induction
on X, Left can win H +XL moving last, and Left can still win H +X moving first.
Now suppose that Left can win G + X moving jth for some j with 2 ≤ j ≤ N .
Set i = N−j+1. So, with Left moving (j−1)st, Left can win any G+XCi and any
GCi +X. Then, with Left moving (j−1)st, Left can win any H+XCi (by induction
on X) or HCi + X (since every HCi has a corresponding GCi with GCi ≤L HCi).
But those are all of the Centeri options of H + X, so Left can win H + X moving
jth.
For all starting players, we have shown that Left having a winning strategy in
G + X implies they have one in H + X, so G ≤L H by Definition 4.8.
Proposition 4.35. Suppose that H is obtained from G by replacing various options
with options for the same player that are equal to the original ones. More precisely,
suppose that each of the following holds.
• G ∼= {G C0 | G C1 | G C2 | · · · | G CN−2 | G CN−1}
• H ∼= {H C0 |H C1 |H C2 | · · · |H CN−2 |H CN−1}
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
– For all G′ ∈ G Ci , there exists H ′ ∈H Ci satisfying G′ = H ′
– For all H ′ ∈H Ci , there exists G′ ∈ G Ci satisfying G′ = H ′
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Then G = H.
Proof. By the Components of Equality (Proposition 4.17), all of the options of G
obey all inequalities with the corresponding options of H. For example, if N > 2,
then H ′ ≤C1 G′ for all G′ ∈ G C2 and H ′ ∈H C2 . Applying the Inequality Test 2N
times and using Components of Equality again, results in G = H.
Theorem 4.36 (Deleting Dominated Options). Let G be a game with at least two
Left options GL1 and GL2 , which satisfy GL1 ≤L GL2 . Suppose that H is obtained
from G by removing the Left option GL1 . Then H =L G.
Proof. Since all the options of H are options of G, the Inequality Test yields H ≤L
G. Since all the options of G are options of H except for GL1 , and GL1 ≤L GL2 , the
Inequality Test yields G ≤L H. The claim follows from Definition 4.14 for =L.
Note that by Proposition 4.15, this reduces to the standard theorem in the two-
player case (see Thm. II.2.4 in [8]).
Unfortunately, with more than two players, we only obtain equality for a particu-
lar player. In fact, deleting a dominated option need not even preserve the outcome
of the game.
Proposition 4.37. If N > 2, there exist games G and H satisfying G =L H by
Deleting Dominated Options, but o(G) 6= o(H).
Proof. There exist games JL1 and JL2 such that for the games with no options
for players other than Left, G ∼= {JL1 , JL2 | · · · |} and H ∼= {JL2 | · · · |}, we have
G =L H, but o (G) 6= o (H).
Take JL1 to be a game which allows each player to move once in turn, starting
with Center1 and ending with Left, and then Center1 may move once more (so that
Center2 loses). Take J
L2 to be the same, except the last option is another move for
Left (so that Center1 loses) instead of a move for Center1.
The game trees for the case of N = 3 are illustrated below.
JL1
•
•
•
•
•
JL2
•
•
•
•
•
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By the Inequality Test, 1C1 ≤L 1L. With this as a starting point, we work our
way up the game trees to see that multiple applications of the Inequality Test yield
JL1 ≤L JL2 . Thus, by Deleting Dominated Options, we can delete the dominated
option to find
{
JL1 , JL2 | · · · |} =L {JL2 | · · · |}.
To distinguish the outcomes of the two games, we examine the restrictions[{
JL1 , JL2 | · · · |}]
L
and
[{
JL2 | · · · |}]
L
to see if Center2 has a winning strategy.
In
[{
JL2 | · · · |}]
L
, the only line of play leads to [1L]C1 . In this case, Center1
loses, and so Center2 wins. o
([{
JL2 | · · · |}]
L
)
= {N,O2, . . . ,ON−1}.
But in
[{
JL1 , JL2 | · · · |}]
L
, Left may choose to move to JL1 for a line of play
ending with [1C1 ]C1 followed by [0]C2 . In this case, Center2 loses. Thus,
o
([{
JL1 , JL2 | · · · |}]
L
)
= {N,O3, . . . ,ON−1} = o
([{
JL2 | · · · |}]
L
)− {O2}.
Since the outcomes of the Left restrictions are not equal, o(G) 6= o(H).
Theorem 4.38 (Bypassing Reversible Options). Let G be a game, and suppose
that some N th option satisfies GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ ≤L G. Put
G′ ∼=
{
GL̂Ĉ1···R̂L, GL
′ | GC | GR
}
,
where GL̂Ĉ1···R̂L ranges over all Left options of GL̂Ĉ1···R̂, and GL
′
ranges over all
Left options of G except for GL̂. Then G′ =L G.
Proof. Suppose Left can win G + X moving first. If they can win by moving to
some G+XL, then by induction they could win G′ +XL moving last, so they can
win G′+X moving first. And if Left can win by moving to some GL
′
+X (not GL̂)
then they can do the same in G′ + X.
Define H ∼= GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ + X. The interesting case is if Left can win G + X by
moving to GL̂ + X. Then the other players can respond by moving to H, so Left
can win H moving first.
If Left can win H by moving to some GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ +XL, then Left can win G+XL
(since GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ ≤L G). But then Left could win G + X by moving to G + XL,
so we’re in the former case again. And if Left can win H by moving to some
GL̂Ĉ1···R̂L + X, they could do the same in G′ + X.
Now suppose Left has a winning strategy in G + X moving ith for some i with
2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Then they can win all GCN−i+1 + X and G + XCN−i+1 moving
(i− 1)st. But GCN−i+1 + X are some of the CenterN−i+1 options of G′ + X. And,
by induction, Left can win the other CenterN−i+1 options which have the form
G′ + XCN−i+1 .
Therefore, G ≤L G′. It remains to show that G′ ≤L G.
Suppose Left can win G′ + X moving first. Then there are three cases.
If they win by moving to some GL
′
+X, they can do the same in G+X. If they
win by moving to G′+XL, then by induction they can win by moving to G+XL. If
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they win by moving to GL̂Ĉ1···R̂L +X, this means they could also win GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ +X
by moving to GL̂Ĉ1···R̂L + X. Since GL̂Ĉ1···R̂ ≤L G, Left can win G + X moving
first.
The other cases where Left can win G′ + X moving ith for some i with 2 ≤ i ≤
N − 1 are routine.
Since we proved both inequalities, G′ =L G.
Unfortunately, as with Deleting Dominated Options (Theorem 4.36), Bypassing
Reversible Options need not preserve outcomes (cf. Proposition 4.37).
Proposition 4.39. If N > 2, then there exists a game G such that G =L 0 by
Bypassing Reversible Options, but o(G) 6= o(0).
Proof. Take G ∼= {H | · · · | } where H only has two options, both for Center1; the
options are 0 (to make Center2 lose) and 1C2 + · · · + 1CN−1 . The case of N = 3 is
illustrated below.
G
H
• •
•
Note that 0 ≤L G by Proposition 4.23. Thus, by Bypassing Reversible Options,
we can bypass the Left option through 0 to find G =L 0. (This could also be verified
with the Nonpositivity Rule as in the proof of Corollary 4.28.)
To distinguish the outcomes of the two games, we examine [G]L and [0]L to see
whether the previous player (Right) has a winning strategy.
In [0]L, Left loses immediately, so o ([0]L) = {O1, . . . ,ON−1}. But in [G]L, Left
must move to [H]C . Then Center1 may choose to move to 0 so that Center2 loses.
Thus,
o ([G]L) = {O1,O3, . . . ,ON−1} = o ([0]L)− {O2}.
Since the outcomes of the Left restrictions are not equal, o(G) 6= o(0).
4.3. Integers
Earlier, we defined games with a single move for various players. For example,
1C1
∼= { | 0 | · · · | }. Following [1], we can extend these definitions to define various
“integers”. We can similarly define 2L ∼= {1L, 0 | · · · | }, 3L ∼= {2L, 1L, 0 | · · · | } etc.
And analogously for the other players.
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In this subsection, as a sort of case study and application of the earlier results,
we examine these integers and some related games in detail.
4.3.1. Comparing Integers
Proposition 4.40. If 0 ≤ k < m, then k · 1L <L m · 1L.
Proof. By Proposition 4.23 (or the Nonnegativity Rule if N > 2), 0 ≤L 1L. Then
by Proposition 4.10, we can add j · 1L to both sides, to obtain j · 1L ≤L (j + 1) · 1L
for all j. By Proposition 4.13, a strict inequality propagates, so it remains to show
that (j + 1) · 1L L j · 1L for all j.
Note that by Proposition 4.6, Left loses j · 1L + (j · 1L)− moving first. But by
counting moves, we see that Left wins (j + 1) · 1L + (j · 1L)− moving first.
Proposition 4.41. If 1 ≤ k and 1 ≤ i < N , then k · 1Ci <L 0.
Proof. Since 1Ci has no Left options, Left loses immediately when moving first, and
so G ≤L 0 by the Nonpositivity Rule.
If N = 2, k · (−1)  0 is well-known. For N > 2, since 1Ci has an option for
a player other than Left, the Nonnegativity Rule yields G L 0. Putting both
inequalities together, G <L 0.
Proposition 4.42. If N > 2, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N−1, i 6= j, and 1 ≤ k, `, then kCi L `Cj .
By symmetry, this means that integers for distinct non-Left players are incom-
parable for Left.
Proof. Note that Left wins kCi + (1Cj )
− moving first since Centerj has no move
available. But Left loses `Cj + (1Cj )
− moving first since Left has no move available
after each player has moved once (regardless of which move Centerj makes).
Lemma 4.43. If k < m, then m · 1Ci <L k · 1Ci for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Proof. First, we prove ≤L. If k = 0, then this follows immediately from the In-
equality Test since m ·1Ci has no Left options and 0 ·1Ci has no non-Left options. If
k > 0, then we can add k ·1Ci to both sides of (m−k)·1Ci ≤L 0 by Proposition 4.10.
To show that the inequality is strict, note that Left wins k · 1Ci + (m · 1Ci)−
moving first (since Centeri runs out of moves), but not m · 1Ci + (m · 1Ci)−.
Theorem 4.44. For k ≥ 0, kL = k · 1L.
Proof. k = 0 and k = 1 are trivial, so we assume k ≥ 2. By definition, kL ∼=
{0, 1L, 2L, . . . , (k − 1)L | · · · | }. By induction and Proposition 4.35 allowing the
replacement of options with equals, we may assume kL = {0, 1L, 2·1L, . . . , (k−1)·1L |
· · · | }.
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By Proposition 4.40, we see that (k− 1) · 1L is the best of these options for Left.
Thus, we can repeatedly Delete Dominated Options in kL to find kL =L k · 1L. By
the Components of Equality, it remains to show that kL =Ci k ·1L for 1 ≤ i ≤ N−1.
First, we show that kL ≤Ci k · 1L. The Inequality Test adapted for ≤Ci says
that for any GCi we need a corresponding HCi , but neither game has a Centeri
option. And neither game has options for players other than Left and Centeri,
either. So we just need to verify that for all (k · 1L)L, there is a corresponding kLL
with kLL ≤Ci (k · 1L)L. But the only option (k · 1L)L is (k − 1) · 1L, which is also a
Left option of kL (up to equality), so that (k − 1) · 1L ≤Ci (k − 1) · 1L suffices.
Next, we show that k · 1L ≤Ci kL. Similarly to the other direction, we need only
handle each Left option of kL. It remains to check that (k − 1) · 1L ≤Ci j · 1L for
j ≤ k − 1. This follows immediately from Lemma 4.43 with players switched.
Since k · 1L ≤Ci kL and kL ≤Ci k · 1L, we have kL =Ci k · 1L for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Since we also verified that kL =L k · 1L, Components of Equality yields kL = k · 1L,
as desired.
4.3.2. Sums of Integers
Proposition 4.45. Evaluating the outcome of a sum of integers (such as 3C2)
reduces to the case of evaluating the outcome of a game of the form k0 · 1C0 + · · ·+
kN−1 · 1CN−1 for nonnegative integers k0, . . . , kN−1.
Proof. Note that by Theorem 4.44, a sum of multiple integers for the same player
can be reduced to a sum of ones; for example, kL + jL = (k+ j) · 1L. Corollary 4.18
tells us that we can make such replacements throughout a sum of integers for var-
ious players. By the definition of Partizan Equality (Definition 4.16), the outcome
doesn’t change when a game is replaced by an equal one.
Proposition 4.46. Let k0, . . . , kN−1 be nonnegative integers with minimum kmin,
and i be an integer with 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. If j is the least nonnegative integer with
ki+j = kmin or ki+j−N = kmin, then
o
([
k0 · 1C0 + · · ·+ kN−1 · 1CN−1
]
Ci
)
= {O0, . . . ,ON−1} − {Oj}.
Proof. Suppose that Centeri moves first in k0 · 1C0 + · · · + kN−1 · 1CN−1 . There is
only one line of play. After N ∗ kmin moves, all coefficients that were equal to kmin
have been reduced to 0, so that the next player to move (starting with Centeri)
with a corresponding 0 coefficient will lose, and all other players will win.
Corollary 4.47. In a sum of the form kCi +K · (1Ci)− with K > k, Centeri loses
regardless of how they play or which player moves first.
Proof. By Propositions 4.45 and 4.46, all players other than Centeri have winning
strategies, regardless of which player moves first. But the players other than Centeri
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have no choice in their moves, so there is no other way they could play to allow
Centeri to win.
4.3.3. Games Less than One
In the two-player context, there are results such as {−1 | } = 0, since a move that
benefits Right can’t help Left. But with three or more players, things are more
subtle.
Theorem 4.48. If N > 2, then for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
0 <L · · · <L {3Ci | · · · | } <L {2Ci | · · · | } <L {1Ci | · · · | } <L 1L.
Proof. There are four claims that must be verified.
1. 0 ≤L {kCi | · · · | } for all k.
2. {kCi | · · · | } L 0 for all k.
3. {mCi | · · · | } ≤L {kCi | · · · | } for k < m.
4. {kCi | · · · | } L {mCi | · · · | } for k < m.
Claim 1 follows from the Nonnegativity Rule (Theorem 4.24).
Claim 2 follows from the fact that Left wins each {kCi | · · · | } moving first (here
we use N > 2), but does not win 0 moving first.
Claim 3 follows from Theorem 4.44 to convert the integers into equal sums of 1Ci ,
Proposition 4.35 to replace them in the options, Lemma 4.43 to compare those sums
of 1Ci , and one application of the Inequality Test to obtain the desired inequality.
Claim 4 requires more care. To witness the inequality, we define a game G
differently in the cases i = 1 and i > 1.
If i = 1, then define G to be the game with only one option in which Center2
can move to (m − 1) · 1L + (m − 1) · 1C2 +
∑
3≤j≤N−1
m · 1Cj . If 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
then define G to be the game with only one option in which Center1 can move to
(m− 1) · 1L + (m− 1) · 1C1 +
∑
2≤j≤N−1, j 6=i
m · 1Cj .
Either way, Left has a winning strategy in {kCi | · · · | }+G moving first. The only
lines of play lead to a position of the form k̂Ci + (m−1) · (1Ci)− for some k̂ ≤ k−1,
with Left to move. From here, by Corollary 4.47, Centeri will lose even if they play
well. However, Left does not have a winning strategy in {mCi | · · · | } + G moving
first. Assuming Centeri plays well, play leads to a position equal to ((m− 1) · 1L)+
((m− 1) · 1L)− with Left to move, so that Left does not have a winning strategy
by Proposition 4.6.
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Corollary 4.49. If N = 3, our ≤L is incompatible with the one defined by Cincotti
in Subsection 2.3 of [1].
Proof. Note that 0 <L {1C | | } by Theorem 4.48. But under Cincotti’s recursive
definition, we would have 0 ≥L {1C | | } since 1C L 0.
5. Conclusions
Throughout this paper, we have seen a variety of generalizations of two-player
theorems, and regularity in results that apply for N > 2. It appears that the
normal play convention considered in this paper may be the easiest to investigate
for N players, without discarding parts of the game tree (as in [1]) or making any
assumptions on how players play (as in [3] and other papers mentioned in I.4 of [8]).
That said, when considering combinatorial games with more than two players,
there is a world of gaps and fundamental questions that remain unsettled.
For just the case of impartial three-player games, there are other similar play
conventions worth considering, each depending on the winner(s) and loser(s) of 0,
analogous to mise`re play. In [6], Propp analyzed the convention in which Previous is
the unique winner of 0. But that still leaves four other non-trivial play conventions
that do not seem to have been investigated in the literature. For example, consider
the similar convention in which Other is the unique winner of 0. The 2 conventions
other than normal play with a unique loser for 0 may be particularly difficult to
analyze.
Question 1. For reach of the remaining four non-trivial play conventions, inves-
tigate the sum table analogous to Table 1.
Even when restricting ourselves to normal play, much is still unknown. As noted
at the end of Subsection 2.2 (just before 2.3), we can build many equal impartial
games by replacing one absorbing subposition with another. Are there other equal
games? For instance, perhaps 3 · ∗ = 6 · ∗ in the three-player case.
We might hope to find a recursive test for equality similar to the two-player
mise`re Theorem V.3.6 from [8]. However, no simple translation of that result can
handle the three-player case under normal play. A key part of that argument is
Lemma V.3.3, which uses T ∼= {G−1 , G−2 , . . . , G−k , U} and then considers G+T and
H +T . In that case, options such as Gi+T and G+G
−
i have an option of the form
Gi + G
−
i with N /∈ o
(
Gi + G
−
i
)
. We can therefore conclude that O /∈ o(Gi + T ).
But without a property such as “O ∈ o (Gi + G−i ) for all Gi” or “P ∈ o (Gi + G−i )
for some Gi”, we can’t conclude anything further about options of G + T such as
Gi + T , no matter what we know about G + U .
Question 2. For N > 2, is there a non-isomorphic pair of equal impartial games
that do not have an absorbing subposition?
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Even without more ability to test for equality, it would be nice to complete
Proposition 2.16 about the outcomes of 3 ·G. While there were no surprises under
normal play for doubling, Claim 9 from Section 4 of [6] suggests that there could be
another obstruction to the outcome of 3 ·G aside from the obstructions that apply
to all sums and Proposition 2.15 about move mirroring.
Question 3. Under normal play, is there a game G with three-player outcome N
such that P ∈ o(3 ·G)?
Restricting ourselves to the particular game of N -player Nim for N > 2, it is not
certain how similar things must be to the three-player case.
Question 4. Are all Nim positions N -periodic?
This need not hold outside of normal play, even for N = 3. For example, in the
three-player convention in which Other is the unique winner of 0, o(2 · ∗3) = O, but
o(3 · ∗+ 2 · ∗3) = ∅.
In the proof of Corollary 3.30, we show that certain very large Nim positions are
always absorbing. The author suspects this can be improved considerably.
Question 5. If N > 2, do N · ∗2 and 2 · ∗N have the absorbing property in the Nim
Quotient?
If so, then 2(N − 1) · ∗2 and N · ∗N are absorbing (for all impartial games) by
the Absorbing Game Construction (Theorem 3.17).
The above is far from an exhaustive list of avenues for future research. Loopy
games, nondisjunctive compounds, other case studies such as Rhombination from
[3], etc. are all wide open.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we follow the compact notation for impartial games used in V.2
of [8] for analyzing two-player mise`re play.
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Specifically,
• ∗GHJ denotes the game {∗G, ∗H, ∗J}. For example, note that ∗21 denotes
{∗2, ∗}, rather than a nim-heap of size twenty-one.
• ∗G# denotes the game {∗G}.
• ∗GH denotes ∗G + ∗H.
Some examples of this notation from [8] are as follows.
• ∗2#320 ∼= {{∗2} , ∗3, ∗2, 0}
• ∗2##2 ∼= {{∗2}}+ ∗2
• ∗22## ∼= {{∗2 + ∗2}}
The following tables are all for impartial games with three players.
∅ N O P NO OP PN
∅ ∗2#2 × × × × × ×
N ∗3 ∗(1#1)20 ∗2 × ∗(1#1)(20)0 × ×
O ∗22 × ∗2# × × × ×
P ∗221# × × × × × ×
NO ∗2121 ∗21 ∗211 ∗(210)# ∗21 ∗(1#1)1 ∗1#
OP ∗(21)# × ∗(211)# ∗211# × 0 ×
PN ∗(21)## ∗210 ∗(1#21)# × ∗ × ×
Table 7: Doubling examples — The row is o(G) and the column is o(G + G).
∅ O P OP
∅ ∗223 × × ×
N ∗2 ∗((1#1)1)20 ? ?
O ∗2# ∗1#2 × ×
P ∗2#1# × × ×
NO ∗21 ∗(210)# ∗(21)### ∗1#
OP ∗211# ∗(210)## ∗(21)# 0
PN ∗2#1#0 ∗210 ∗1#0 ∗
Table 8: Trebling Examples — The row is o(G) and the column is o(3 ·G).
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∅+ ∅ = ∅ ∗2#2 ∗2#2 O +PN = N ∗22 ∗
∅+N = ∅ ∗2#2 ∗2 O +PN =P ∗2# ∗
∅+N = N ∗2###21# ∗2 O +PN =PN ∗1#2 ∗
∅+ O = ∅ ∗2#2 ∗2# P +P = ∅ ∗2## ∗2##
∅+P = ∅ ∗2#2 ∗2## P +NO = ∅ ∗2## ∗1#1
∅+NO = ∅ ∗222 ∗1#1 P +NO = N ∗221# ∗(1#0)#
∅+NO = N ∗222 ∗1# P +NO = O ∗2## ∗1#
∅+NO = O ∗2#2 ∗1#1 P +NO = NO ∗221# ∗1#
∅+NO = NO ∗2#2 ∗1# P + OP = ∅ ∗2## ∗21#
∅+ OP = ∅ ∗2#2 0 P + OP =P ∗2## 0
∅+PN = ∅ ∗222 ∗ P +PN = ∅ ∗22# ∗21##
∅+PN = N ∗2#2 ∗ P +PN = N ∗2## ∗
N +N = ∅ ∗2 ∗20 NO +NO = ∅ ∗31 ∗(1#0)#
N +N = N ∗2 ∗1#20 NO +NO = N ∗1# ∗1#1
N +N = O ∗2 ∗2 NO +NO = O ∗211 ∗211
N +N = NO ∗2 ∗1#10 NO +NO =P ∗1# ∗(1#0)#
N + O = ∅ ∗2 ∗22 NO +NO = NO ∗1#1 ∗1#1
N + O = N ∗2 ∗2# NO +NO = OP ∗(1#1)1 ∗(1#1)1
N +P = ∅ ∗2### ∗2## NO +NO =PN ∗1# ∗1#
N +P = N ∗2 ∗2## NO + OP = ∅ ∗1#1 ∗21#
N +NO = ∅ ∗2#2 ∗1# NO + OP = N ∗1# ∗(1#0)##
N +NO = N ∗1#10 ∗1# NO + OP = O ∗1# ∗21#
N +NO = O ∗2 ∗211 NO + OP = NO ∗1# 0
N +NO =P ∗2### ∗1# NO +PN = ∅ ∗211 ∗1#0
N +NO = NO ∗20 ∗1# NO +PN = N ∗(1#0)# ∗1#0
N +NO = OP ∗2 ∗(1#1)1 NO +PN = O ∗(1#0)# ∗
N +NO =PN ∗2 ∗1# NO +PN =P ∗1# ∗21##
N + OP = ∅ ∗2### ∗21# NO +PN = NO ∗211 ∗
N + OP = N ∗2 0 NO +PN = OP ∗1# ∗
N +PN = ∅ ∗2##2 ∗ NO +PN =PN ∗1#1 ∗
N +PN = N ∗1#10 ∗ OP + OP = ∅ ∗21# ∗21#
N +PN = O ∗2### ∗ OP + OP = O ∗1## ∗(1#0)##
N +PN = NO ∗2 ∗ OP + OP =P ∗1## ∗21#
O + O = ∅ ∗2# ∗22 OP + OP = OP 0 0
O + O = O ∗2# ∗2# OP +PN = ∅ ∗21# ∗21##
O +P = ∅ ∗2# ∗2## OP +PN = N ∗21# ∗
O +NO = ∅ ∗22 ∗21 OP +PN =P ∗(1#0)## ∗1###
O +NO = N ∗2# ∗1# OP +PN =PN 0 ∗
O +NO = O ∗22 ∗1#1 PN +PN = ∅ ∗21## ∗21##
O +NO = NO ∗1#2 ∗1# PN +PN = N ∗ ∗1#0
O + OP = ∅ ∗1#2 ∗21# PN +PN = O ∗1### ∗21##
O + OP = O ∗2# 0 PN +PN = NO ∗ ∗
O +PN = ∅ ∗2# ∗1#0
Table 9: Examples of pairs of impartial games witnessing all outcomes of sums
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